The end of metaphysics as a science in the Kantian Theory of Knowledge

Abstract

The Modern Age was a crucial stage for the development of scientific knowledge and the
theory of knowledge. This as a result of the disenchantment that arose with the collapse of a
theological epistemology of several centuries that in the end demonstrated its unanimity,
except for the control of the majorities. Emmanuel Kant becomes the Gordian knot of that time,
trying to reconcile rationalism with empiricism, after revealing the error of each one: the
rationalists seem detached from the real world and concentrated on pure mathematics;
empiricists seem absorbed in nature and do not realize that reason can bring order to the
chaos of phenomena. Kant believes that both are needed, and that it is only necessary to
explain how this marriage between the idea and the real is formed. In this journey, he realizes
that Metaphysics remains in the middle, indecisive, hesitant, and without clarity regarding its
claims to Science. He concludes that it is not possible because it is generally based on
sophistic reasoning, paralogisms, antinomies and contradictions that do not end in anything
convincing, neither of those who affirm the existence of transphysical beings or of those who
deny them. Both have to resort to fallacies to defeat the other. But Kant also realizes that
Metaphysics seems to have accompanied man for centuries, and that it does not seem that it
can cease or cease to seduce him in the centuries to come, for various reasons, including the
fear of the unknown, the mystery , ignorance, lack of scientific or logical rigor. For pedagogical
reasons, rather than anti-theological, we approach the subject of metaphysics and the Kantian
critique that turns out to be definitive, although its effluvia is still spread throughout
contemporary life.